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NOTES ON CONTROLLABILITY* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with controllability, which has often been discussed as a 
defining feature of transitivity. In earlier works, the treatment of controllability was 
not straightforward since it is intuitively related to intentionality/volitionality, another 
critical feature of transitivity.1 Lakoff (1977: 244) refers to these notions separately in 
his list of the prototypical features of transitivity, while the list given in Hopper and 
Thompson (1980: 252) only includes volitionality.2 In recent works, however, various 
phenomena supporting Lakoff’s intuition have been found. For example, Pardeshi 
(2002) argues that in Japanese, several types of non-intentional events can (or must) 
be encoded with the canonical transitive pattern of case marking because they are 
construed to be controllable. As a test for the presence of controllability, the negative 
imperative construction is commonly adopted (Bugenhagen 1989; Kageyama 1996; 
Chung 2005, etc.). This method is viable to a certain degree since the feature of 
controllability presupposes that some sentient entity is involved as the subject of 
control.  
The aim of this paper is to elaborate Pardeshi’s analysis based upon controllability. 
It will be first pointed out that a group of predicates behave in a way that Pardeshi’s 
theory fails to predict. Then, considering Brennenstuhl’s (1976) insights into 
Nonaction sentences in English, it will be claimed that controllability should be 
divided into two types: outcome control and preliminary control, the latter of which 
cannot be captured by the negative imperative test but by the possibility of semantic 
adjustment that they show in certain constructions. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the previous views 
on controllability. Section 3 critically considers Pardeshi’s claim and seeks to refine 
the notion of controllability. Section 4 presents some other phenomena that the 
proposed analysis serves to explain. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
                                                          
* I am grateful to Yukio Oba and Sadayuki Okada for their constant encouragement. My thanks also go 
to Mark Donohue, who inspired my interest in transitivity and voice.  
1 I will use intentionality and volitionality as terminological variants, although some researchers 
distinguish them (e.g. Van Valin and Wilkins 1996).  
2 To be more precise, the notion of “degree of control” is mentioned in Hopper and Thompson (1980: 
265), but it is meant to refer to the same thing as “volitionality.” 
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2 DEFINITION OF CONTROLLABILITY AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
The prerequisites for proposing any significant semantic feature are (i) a clear 
definition and (ii) a proper procedure for identifying that feature. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 
will discuss the previous views on controllability with respect to these points. Section 
2.3 will compare controllability and responsibility in order to further clarify the 
characteristics of the former. 
2.1 Conceptual Definition by Pardeshi (2002) 
The notion of controllability presupposes the involvement of a sentient entity in the 
described event; it captures a situation where a sentient entity can have a significant 
effect on the (non)-actualization of the event designated. It is worth noting that the 
notion of controllability can hardly be properly described without reference to its 
related concepts. For instance, Pardeshi (2002) attempts an elaborate definition of 
controllability by referring to intentionality and desirability of outcome: 
... for human beings, the outcomes of some states of affairs are desirable, while 
others are not. Human beings, in general, intentionally bring about events yielding 
desirable outcomes and try to prevent or avoid those leading to undesirable 
consequences. For a state of affairs to be identified as achievable or avoidable, it 
must be conceptualized in the first place as controllable. (Pardeshi 2002: 138; 
emphases in the original) 
One notable thing about this definition is that the notion of avoidance as well as 
achievement is involved. This is where controllability diverges from 
intentionality/volitionality, another crucial feature in the literature on transitivity 
(Hopper and Thompson 1980, etc.). In the most usual sense, as also implied in the 
definition above, intentionality is concerned only with achievement (or realization) of 
events. Therefore, if an event is the kind that one would want to avoid rather than to 
achieve, it is regarded as a “non-intentional event.” For example, building a house is 
an intentional event, while losing one’s key is a non-intentional event. In this spirit, 
Pardeshi defines non-intentional events with the two conditions as follows: 
(1) a.  a human or quasi-human entity NOT acting intentionally 
 b.  a non-intended outcome (adapted from Pardeshi 2002: 127) 
These conditions presuppose that the initiator of an event is a sentient entity that has 
the potential to act intentionally. Thus, events with non-sentient initiators (such as 
natural forces) are excluded from this category. 
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If intentionality/volitionality is a key feature of semantic transitivity (Hopper and 
Thompson 1980), it is quite predictable that some languages encode intentional and 
non-intentional events differently. In fact, according to Pardeshi (2002), Indic 
languages adopt that strategy (specifically, intentional events are marked transitively 
while non-intentional events intransitively). In Japanese, however, such a distinction 
cannot be observed. Compare: 
(2)  Taroo-ga hon-o yonda [intentional event] 
Taro-NOM book-ACC read 
 ‘Taro read a book.’ 
(3)  Taroo-ga saifu-o nakushita [non-intentional event] 
Taro-NOM wallet-ACC lost 
‘Taro lost his wallet.’ 
Following the criteria given in (1), (2) certainly represents an intentional event and (3) 
a non-intentional event. Still, they both receive the canonically transitive case 
marking (i.e. nominative marker –ga for the subject and accusative marker –o for the 
object). Clearly, intentionality does not play a key role here. Therefore, Pardeshi 
claims that Japanese transitive encoding is sensitive to controllability, not 
intentionality. Under his definition, for instance, the “losing wallets” event is 
controllable, just as a “reading a book” event, since we can conceptualize it such that 
the outcome (i.e. losing one’s wallet) is avoidable if one takes proper steps in advance. 
This is of course true of intentional events such as (2); one can conceptualize it such 
that the outcome (i.e. reading a book) is achievable if one takes steps in advance. 
Pardeshi observes that non-intentional events susceptible to the transitive 
encoding in Japanese can be subdivided into three classes: reflexive events (=4a), 
non-reflexive events (=4b), and extended non-reflexive events (=4c). The example in 
(3) belongs to the second category: 
(4) a.  mikka maeni kata-o kowashita 
three days before shoulder-ACC broke 
 ‘(I) injured my shoulder three days ago.’  
 (adapted from Pardeshi 2002: 128) 
 b.  Taroo-wa mato-o hazushita 
   Taro-TOP target-ACC missed 
   ‘Taro missed the target.’ (adapted from Pardeshi 2002: 129) 
 c.  ano koujyou-ga jiko-o okoshita 
   that factory-NOM accident-ACC brought about 
   ‘That factory caused an accident.’(adapted from Pardeshi 2002: 129) 
Hence, Pardeshi’s research supports the position that intentionality and controllability 
should be distinguished, which contrasts sharply with works where controllability is 
not treated as an independent feature (e.g. Hopper and Thompson 1980). 
Distinguishing intentionality and controllability is by no means a brand new idea. 
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DeLancey (1985), for instance, observes that volitionality (in the same sense as 
intentionality) and controllability are two independent features in Lhasa Tibetan, 
showing that some non-volitional yet controllable events are coded differently from 
those lacking in both features. This view, as well as Pardeshi’s, strongly implies that 
controllability underlies a wider range of eventualities than intentionality. 
Furthermore, intentionality presupposes controllability, but the opposite is not true. In 
the same vein, Chung (2005: 46) says that controllability “comes out to be recognized 
when intentionality is absent,” clearly implicating that controllability is always there 
as long as an eventuality is intentional. 
Also worth noting about Pardeshi’s definition of controllability is the notion of 
“desirability of outcome.” At first glance it seems that intentionality and desirability 
of outcome coincide, but they do not. Just as people can act intentionally to achieve 
desirable goals, they can act intentionally to avoid undesirable results as well. 
Although Pardeshi does not mention this, his theory can be extended to cases where 
the act of avoidance is directly lexicalized, as exemplified below: 
(5) a.  Taroo-ga sono jiko-o fuseida 
Taro-NOM that accident-ACC prevented 
‘Taro prevented the accident.’ 
 b.  Jiroo-ga hihan-o kawashita 
   Jiro-NOM criticism-ACC avoided 
‘Jiro avoided the criticism.’ 
Predicates of this sort describe the act of intentionally avoiding undesirable outcomes. 
The fact that such predicates are also encoded with the canonical transitive marking 
indicates that desirability of outcome does not matter to the coding strategy. This 
supports Pardeshi’s claim that the key feature for the canonical transitive case 
marking is controllability. 
Now that we have a conceptual definition of controllability, let us turn to a viable 
test to see whether a predicate denotes a controllable event. 
2.2 The Negative Imperative as a Test for Controllability 
Pardeshi (2002: 139–141) utilizes the negative imperative as a test to determine 
whether or not a predicate denotes a controllable event, claiming that the Japanese 
language treats a wider range of non-intentional events as controllable ones than Indic 
languages. To illustrate, let us observe the following: 
(6) [non-reflexive non-intentional events] 
 a.  Taroo-ga saifu-o nakushita [Japanese] 
Taro-NOM wallet-ACC lost 
‘Taro lost his wallet.’ (=(3)) 
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 b.  mi paakiT haraw-l-a [Marathi] 
   I wallet.N lose-PERF-N 
   ‘I lost my wallet.’ (adapted from Pardeshi 2002: 131) 
(7) [reflexive non-intentional events]   
 a.  kodomo-ga ashi-o suberaseta [Japanese] 
child-NOM leg-ACC slipped 
‘The child slipped on his leg.’ 
 b. * babcce-ne pair phisal-aa-yaa [Hindi] 
   child-ERG leg.M slip-CAUS-PAST.M 
   ‘The child slipped on his leg.’ (adapted from Pardeshi 2002: 131) 
As shown in (6), to encode non-reflexive non-intentional events, both Japanese and an 
Indic language, Marathi, adopt the transitive encoding. In the domain of reflexive 
non-intentional events, on the other hand, Japanese and Indic languages differ, as 
shown in (7): the latter tends to use the intransitive encoding while Japanese permits 
the transitive encoding. Pardeshi claims that the possibility of the transitive encoding 
should be tested by applying the formation of the negative imperative: If a predicate 
allows the formation, it can be encoded transitively; if not, it cannot. This is 
confirmed by the comparable (un)grammaticality between the sentences in (6) and (7) 
on the one hand and their negative imperative counterparts given in (8) and (9) on the 
other. 
(8) a.  saifu o nakusu na 
wallet ACC lose PROH 
‘Don’t lose your wallet.’ 
 b.  paaKit harwu nakos (Pardeshi 2002: 139) 
(9) a.  ashi o suberasu na 
leg ACC slip PROH 
‘Don’t slip on your leg.’  
 b. * pair naa phislaanaa  (Pardeshi 2002: 141) 
Pardeshi’s choice is not uncommon. The negative imperative formation often comes 
into play in accounting for phenomena involving controllability. Bugenhagen (1989) 
and Kageyama (1996), for example, use the negative imperative (or “prohibitive,” 
following Bugenhagen’s terminology) to reveal the semantic characteristics of 
experiential predications, which describe situations involving the Experiencer, rather 
than the Agent or Patient/Theme. Bugenhagen (1989: 88–89) argues that a test for the 
difference between totally passive states of affairs (involving Patient/Theme) and 
those in which the Experiencer has at least some small measure of control is whether 
or not their linguistic encoding may have the prohibitive modality: 
(10) * Don’t have a fever / be hungry / like hot bread.3 
                                                          
3 Bugenhagen (1989) marks these sentences with “??” to indicate semantic/pragmatic anomaly rather 
than grammaticality. In this paper I consistently use “*” to indicate semantic/pragmatic anomaly. 
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    (adapted from Bugenhagen 1989: 87) 
(11)  Don’t be angry / be afraid / get upset / be surprised.  (ibid.) 
The oddness of (10) can be attributed to the inappropriateness of commanding 
someone to do something that is totally beyond their control. The naturalness of (11), 
on the other hand, indicates that the Experiencer exercises a minor degree of control 
over the occurrence of the denoted situation. 
In a similar fashion, Kageyama (1996) remarks that experiential predicates cannot 
form natural imperatives, as shown in (12), while they are compatible with the 
negative imperative, as in (13). This is also true of experiential predicates of emotion, 
as contrasted in (14) and (15): 
(12) a. * Catch a cold.  
 b. * Fracture your left leg.   (Kageyama 1996: 88) 
(13) a.  Don’t catch a cold. 
 b.  Don’t fracture your leg.  (ibid.) 
(14) a. * Be angry! 
 b. * Be sad! 
 c. * Be nervous!  (Ljung 1975: 141) 
(15) a.  Don’t be angry! 
 b.  Don’t be sad! 
 c.  Don’t be nervous! (ibid.) 
These contrasts indicate that experiential predicates are different from predicates 
denoting more prototypical transitive situations, since the latter certainly allows both 
types of imperative. 
(16) a.  Kill the chicken! 
 b.  Break the glass! 
(17) a.  Don’t kill the chicken! 
 b.  Don’t break the glass! 
Chung (2005: 45–46), following Kageyama (1996) and Pardeshi (2002), argues that 
intentionality and controllability should be distinguished as two independent features, 
proposing to use two types of imperatives as tests for them: the imperative for 
intentionality and the negative imperative for controllability, respectively. 
Thus, it is virtually a general consensus among researchers that the negative 
imperative is a viable test for controllability. 
2.3 On Responsibility and Controllability 
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Before turning to our discussion, some comments on the terminology “responsibility” 
are in order. At times “responsibility” is used in place of controllability (Nishimura 
1993; Pardeshi 2002). More precisely, it is assumed in such studies that controllability 
underlies responsibility. However, this is at variance with the notion of responsibility 
as discussed in earlier works (Lakoff 1977; van Oosten 1986). 
Lakoff (1977) and van Oosten (1986) apply the notion of responsibility to 
non-human as well as human entities, attempting to explain the semantic constraints 
on the subject of the middle construction (e.g., This book sells well vs. *This book 
buys well). Crucially, it is argued that responsibility is a crucial feature of the subject. 
A middle construction is possible when its subject denotes an entity that can be 
construed to be responsible for the realization of the event designated. It is obvious 
that responsibility is applicable to non-human entities since the subject position of a 
middle construction is dominantly artifacts. Nishimura and Pardeshi, on the other 
hand, limit the usage of this term to human entities. This is a matter of course since 
controllability, which is supposed to underlie responsibility in their definition, is 
applicable only to human entities, as discussed earlier. 
Thus, Nishimura (1993) and Pardeshi (2002) use the term “responsibility” in a 
narrower sense than Lakoff (1977) and van Oosten (1986).4 This is why we should 
persist with “controllability” rather than “responsibility” in this paper. 
3 DISCUSSION 
3.1 Counterexamples to Pardeshi (2002) 
There is a class of predicates that constitutes counterexamples to Pardeshi’s claim: 
(18) a.  Taroo-wa sono hon-o mitsuketa 
Taroo-TOP that  book-ACC found 
‘Taro found the book.’ 
 b.  Jiroo-wa jiken-o mokugekishita 
   Jiro-TOP accident-ACC witnessed 
   ‘Jiro witnessed an accident.’ 
 c.  Saburoo-wa  sono riron-o rikaishita 
   Saburo-TOP that theory-ACC understood 
   ‘Saburo understood that theory.’ 
(19) a. * sono hon-o mitsukeru-na 
That book-ACC find-PROH 
‘Don’t find the book.’ 
                                                          
4 A possible source of this confusion might be attributed to the difference in transitive encoding 
between English and Japanese; English extensively allows inanimate entities as subjects of transitive 
sentences while Japanese usually does not. 
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 b. * jiken-o mokugekisuru-na 
   accident-ACC witness-PROH 
   ‘Don’t witness an accident.’ 
 c. * sono riron-o rikaisuru-na 
   That theory-ACC understand-PROH 
   ‘Don’t understand that theory.’ 
As shown in (18), these predicates are marked transitively, but they cannot undergo 
the formation of natural negative imperatives, as in (19).5 This means that these 
predicates receive the transitive case marking even though they denote 
non-controllable events, which is clearly at odds with Pardeshi’s account. In light of 
his definition of non-intentional events given in (1), the predicates in (18) certainly 
denote non-intentional events. For example, a person who witnesses an accident must 
be human and s/he would never intend in advance that outcome. Thus, his account 
incorrectly predicts that these predicates are compatible with the prohibitive mood. 
According to Pardeshi’s three-way sub-classification of non-intentional (and 
controllable) events given in (4), the predicates in question should be classified as 
non-reflexive events. Still, they show a different behavior from other members of the 
category such as “forget NP,” “lose NP,” and so forth. Semantically speaking, 
predicates of this class denote, as listed in (20), events relating to the initiator’s 
(accidental) finding or discovering of something, which is quite different from what 
the other non-reflexive predicates denote. Henceforth, this class of predicate will be 
called “F(ind)-predicates.” 
(20)  F-predicates in Japanese: 
 mitsukeru (“find”), mokugekisuru (“witness”), mikakeru (“see”),  
 rikaisuru (“understand, comprehend”), hakkensuru (“discover”), ... 
To seek a proper account of the semantic constraints upon the canonical transitive 
marking in Japanese, therefore, it is essential to observe the semantic structure of the 
F-predicates. To that end, it is helpful to look into the distinction between “Action” 
and “Nonaction” sentences in English, which was proposed in Brennenstuhl (1976). 
3.2 “Nonaction” Sentences in English and Two Subtypes of Controllability 
Brennenstuhl (1976) argues that simple active sentences with human subjects can 
be further subcategorized into two classes: Simple Action Sentences and Simple 
                                                          
5 (19a) might be usable in a context where the speaker and addressee actually know where the book is 
and the former is asking the latter not to do the actual act of finding or to pretend not to know where it is 
(Hideki Mori, p.c.). Still, this is too deviant a usage from the original meaning of the verb mitsukeru 
“find” to conclude that it is compatible with the negative imperative. As to the pretend-reading of the 
imperative, see Brennenstuhl (1976). 
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Nonaction Sentences. This distinction, for example, can be manifested by the contrast 
given below:6 
(21) a.  What is Bob doing? Bob is looking for Bill. 
 b.  What was Bob doing? *Bob found Bill. (Brennenstuhl 1976: 59) 
Finding something is not a normal activity like looking for something but rather it 
occurs to a person. It is this semantic intuition that underlies the distinction in 
question. Simply stated, “Nonactions cannot be done intentionally, for some purpose 
or at will” (p. 62). A few examples for each category are given below: 
(22)  predicates of “Action” sentences (sampled from Brennensthul 1976): 
dream, kick, look for NP, run, show grief, solve NP, study NP, swim, write 
a letter, ... 
(23)  predicates of “Nonaction” sentences (sampled from Brennenstuhl 1976): 
arrive, blush, comprehend NP, cut oneself on a knife, enjoy oneself, find 
NP, get accepted, forget NP, grieve, hurt oneself, lose one’s temper, 
mishear NP, miss NP, recover from NP, remember NP, see NP, spill NP, 
succeed, sweat, understand NP, win NP, ... 
For the present purposes, what should be noted are (i) that non-action predicates are 
not equivalent to so-called stative predicates, and (ii) the category of Nonaction 
includes predicates of non-intentional (but controllable) events as defined in Pardeshi 
(2002), as well as those of non-intentional, uncontrollable events (including the 
F-predicates); predicates such as “mishear NP” belong to the former category and 
those such as “find NP” to the latter. 
As to the first point, it is obvious from (22) and (23) that the distinction under 
discussion crosscut the Vendlerian four-way aspectual distinction; all of the four 
possibilities can be found in either list. Concerning the second point, Brennenstuhl 
alludes to the subdivision of Nonaction sentences by observing that some are 
available in the form of the negative imperative and others are not: 
(24) a.  don’t hurt yourself, don’t catch a cold, don’t forget, don’t spill the milk, 
don’t misunderstand, don’t lose your key, ... 
 b. * don’t bleed, *don’t digest, *don’t find them, *don’t lose your hair,  
  *don’t see, *don’t comprehend, *don’t become older, *don’t itch, 
  *don’t blush, *don’t reach the top, *don’t receive presents, 
  *don’t win the game, ...   (mainly cited from Brennenstuhl 1976: 63) 
Brennenstuhl (1976) accounts for this distinction by appealing to the notion of 
“avoidability of undesirable Nonactions,” which causes the impression of 
                                                          
6 Brennenstuhl (1976) provides seven more tests as procedures to reveal the Action–Nonaction 
distinction, although I will not go into them here for reasons of space. 
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responsibility on the part of the actor. This sounds surprisingly similar to Pardeshi’s 
(2002) account. 
However, Brennenstuhl (1976: 63–64), unlike Pardeshi (2002), takes into 
consideration the notions of “successes” and “mistakes and failures”: mistakes and 
failures denote “breakdown of control” while successes “are beyond control because 
one cannot help to arrive there if one strives for a goal, is able to reach it, makes no 
mistakes and meets no sudden hindrances which cannot be overcome.” 7  Put 
differently, mistakes and failures presuppose the presence of controllability while 
successes do not. With these in mind, it is clear that all the predicates in (24a) denote 
mistakes and failures; they indicate undesirable outcomes that are to be avoided. As to 
successes, on the other hand, it is not the case that all the predicates in (24b) denote 
them. On purely intuitive grounds, one might pick out “reach the top,” “comprehend 
NP,” “find NP,” and “win the game” as predicates of success. To investigate what 
actually underlies this intuition, however, the notion of controllability as defined in 
Pardeshi (2002) is not useful, since, for example, both finding something and losing 
one’s hair are not compatible with the negative imperative, i.e., they are both not 
controllable actions. 
To solve this problem, I propose the distinction between outcome control and 
preliminary control. The former is the distinctive feature for predicates of 
mistake/failure, while the latter characterizes those of success. The outcome control 
means that one can exercise a degree of control over the realization and/or 
non-realization of the event in question.8 Actually, this corresponds to controllability 
as defined in Pardeshi (2002). On the other hand, the notion of preliminary control 
does not concern the (non)-realization of the denoted event, but rather it is exercised 
over the stage preceding the realization of that event. Thus, the outcome control 
entails preliminary control, but not vice versa. 
To illustrate the point, let us compare “miss NP” and “find NP,” which denote 
failure/mistake and success, respectively. The former involves the outcome control; it 
implies that the initiator can exercise control over the (non)-realization of the outcome. 
The denotation of “find NP,” in contrast, may involve only the preliminary control, 
which can be associated with the initiator’s searching process toward finding the 
target. This predicate cannot directly refer to the control over the realization of the 
designated event, because the result is ultimately beyond the initiator’s control; 
people often look for something hard and cannot find it eventually; conversely, people 
sometimes find something accidentally even when they are not looking eagerly for it. 
It is this difference that is made explicit by the negative imperative test (Don’t miss 
NP vs. *Don’t find NP). Hence, in the present theory, that a predicate is available in a 
negative imperative form indicates the presence of outcome control. Thus the 
predicates of mistake/failure exemplified in (25a) can be characterized by the 
presence of outcome control. 
Turning now to the predicates in (25b), what distinguishes predicates of “reach the 
top,” “comprehend NP,” “find NP,” and “win the game” from the others is the 
                                                          
7 Ryle (1949: 125, 143–145) makes insightful remarks on success and failure, although he does not 
refer to the notion of control(lability). 
8 See Klaiman (1991: 115–116) for an artful description of the notion of outcome control, although 
she does not propose any test for it. 
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presence of preliminary control. In other words, these predicates denote “successes.” 
For instance, the event of comprehending something is usually preceded by the 
controlled process of efforts. As to the predicates other than success predicates in 
(26b), no such controllable preliminary stage can be evoked; as to blushing, for 
example, one cannot conceptualize any preceding action that would lead to the 
outcome of blushing.9 
The presence or absence of preliminary control might be tested by decide to or try 
to construction. In these environments, a verb is forced to refer to a preliminary stage 
that preceded the final stage (i.e. outcome) it lexically encodes. Predicates of success 
are generally susceptible to this conceptual adjustment, while other non-intentional, 
non-controllable predicates are not. Compare: 
(25) a.  I decided to solve the problem. 
 b.  The expedition decided to find the snowman. 
    (Brennenstuhl 1976: 60) 
(26) a.  But we have five games to play and we will try to win them all. 
    (BNC: AKE) 
 b.  They will even try to understand the words I have spent so long in 
writing.  (BNC: ADA) 
(27) * He {decided/tried} to {bleed/blush/digest/lose his hair/...}. 
In (26a), for instance, solve means “work towards the solution” rather than “getting at 
the solution” (cf. Brennenstuhl 1976: 60). The predicates such as bleed, blush, digest, 
or lose one’s hair are not accepted in these constructions since they cannot evoke any 
preliminary stages. 
To sum up, we have subclassified non-intentional predicates (or Nonaction 
predicates) into predicates of failure/mistake, predicates of success, and the rest. They 
are characterized and distinguished from one another by the combinations of three 
features: intentionality, outcome control, and preliminary control. The overall picture 











                                                          
9 By the terms such as “preceding process” or “preliminary stage,” I mean the same thing as Smith’s 
(1997) preliminary stage, which was introduced to account for the interpretation that certain achievement 
verbs exhibit in the progressive form (e.g., They are reaching the top). 
predicates 
− intentional + intentional 
− outcome control






From this, the following implicational hierarchy follows. 
(28)  intentionality > outcome controllability > preliminary controllability > 
lack of controllability 
If a predicate with a feature on this scale is compatible with a transitive encoding 
device X, it entails (i) that any predicate with any feature on higher ranks also 
receives X or any other device that indicates higher transitivity than X, and (ii) that 
any predicate with any feature on lower ranks can never be encoded with a device 
indicating higher transitivity than X. 
3.3 Transitive Encoding in Japanese 
Now we are in a position to reconsider the F-predicates and the transitive 
encoding in Japanese. Let us observe again the examples of the F-predicates in (18), 
repeated here as (29): 
(29) a.  Taroo-wa sono hon-o     mitsuketa 
Taroo TOP that  book-ACC found 
‘Taro found the book.’ 
 b.  Jiroo-wa jiken-o mokugekishita 
   Jiro-TOP accident-ACC witnessed 
   ‘Jiro witnessed an accident.’ 
 c.  Saburoo-wa  sono riron-o rikaishita 
   Saburo-TOP that theory-ACC understood 
   ‘Saburo understood that theory.’ 
Building upon the criteria outlined in section 3.2, we can now categorize these as 
“success” predicates since they are compatible with the V-yootosuru (“try to”) 
construction: 
(30) a.  Taroo-wa sono hon-o mitsuke-yootoshi-ta 
Taro-TOP that book-ACC find-try-PAST 
‘Taro tried to find the book.’ 
 b.  Jiroo-wa jiken-o mokugekishi-yootoshi-ta 
   Jiro-TOP accident-ACC witness-try-PAST 
   ‘Jiro tried to witness an accident.’ 
 c.  Saburoo-wa sono riron-o rikaishi-yootoshi-ta 
   Saburo-TOP that theory-ACC understand-try-PAST 
   ‘Saburo tried to understand that theory.’ 
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The sentences in (30) make sense since the preliminary stages toward the denoted 
eventualities can be easily evoked. The sentence (31b), for example, induces us to 
conceptualize efforts on the part of the initiator (i.e. Jiro) such as going to places 
where accidents are expected to happen. Therefore, we can conclude that the “cut-off 
point” for the canonical transitive encoding in Japanese is not outcome control but 
preliminary control. 
It must be noted at this point that not all the predicates of success in English as 
discussed in section 3.2 correspond to the F-predicates in Japanese. Some Japanese 
counterparts of the success predicates in English receive the non-canonically 
transitive case marking pattern whereby the object is marked with the dative case 
marker –ni instead of –o: 
(31) a.  Taroo-ga shiai-{ni/*o} katta 
Taro-NOM game-DAT/*ACC won 
‘Taro won the game.’ 
 b.  Jiroo-ga chojo-{ni/*o} tadoritsuita 
   Jiro-NOM summit-DAT/*ACC reached 
   ‘Jiro reached the summit.’ 
Still, these predicates behave like the F-predicates in that they are not compatible with 
the prohibitive mood: 
(32) a. * shiai-ni katsu-na 
game-DAT win-PROH 
‘Don’t win the game.’ 
 b. * choojoo-ni tadoritsuku-na 
   summit -DAT reach-PROH 
   ‘Don’t reach the summit.’ 
Hence, the presence of controllability (whether outcome or preliminary) says nothing 
about the degree of prototypicality that each sentence exhibits. This is further 
evidenced by the existence of non-intentional controllable predicates with the –ni 
marked objects, as exemplified below: 
(33) a.  Taroo-ga mizo-{ni/*o} hamatta 
Taro-NOM ditch-DAT/*ACC fell 
‘Taro fell into a ditch.’ 
 b.  mizo-ni hamaru-na 
   ditch-DAT fall-PROH 
   ‘Don’t fall into a ditch.’ 
The predicate mizoi ni hamaru “fall into a ditch,” which clearly denotes a 
non-intentional event, passes the negative imperative test, i.e., it shows (outcome) 
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controllability. Still, the object must be marked with the dative particle –ni. Thus, the 
distribution of –ni objects and –o objects cross-cuts that of two types of 
controllability. 
Last but not the least, treating examples in (31) and (33) as transitive sentences 
might be at odds with the traditional view whereby the label “transitive verb” has 
been restricted to the two-place predicates with the non-subject NPs marked with the 
accusative case marker –o. Under this view, if the non-subject NPs are marked with 
particles other than –o, the predicates are classified as “intransitive verbs.” However, 
if one adopts the assumption that transitive sentences constitute a prototype category 
(Hopper and Thompson 1980; Tsunoda 1985, 1991; Jacobsen 1992), our choice is 
preferable, since –ni objects in (31) are virtually obligatory; the sentences take on 
elliptical flavor when the object arguments are not explicitly mentioned: 
(34) a.  Taro ga [e] katta [elliptical] (cf. (31a)) 
 b.  Jiro ga [e] tadoritsuita [elliptical] (cf. (31b)) 
 c.  Saburoo ga [e] hamatta [elliptical] (cf. (32a)) 
Thus, we suppose that dative object transitive sentences are less prototypical instances 
of the transitive sentences (cf. the transitivity scale of two-place predicates proposed 
in Tsunoda 1985, 1991). 
To summarize, we have discussed two points about transitive encoding in 
Japanese: (i) it is sensitive to the presence or absence of preliminary controllability, 
rather than outcome controllability, and (ii) controllability alone does not predict 
anything about whether the object is marked with the accusative marker –o or other 
particles (mainly –ni). 
4 CASES WHERE OUTCOME CONTROL MATTERS 
In section 3, we saw that Japanese transitive encoding is not sensitive to the difference 
between outcome and preliminary controls. In this brief section, we will observe the 
phenomena that are describable by the presence or absence of outcome control. In 
section 4.1, we will take up Lhasa Tibetan, a language where the transitive encoding 
reflects the difference between the two types of controllability. Section 4.2 focuses on 
a Japanese verb mistukaru and observes how outcome control affects its interpretation 
and argument structure. 
4.1 Lhasa Tibetan 
As seen in section 3.3, the significant cut-off point for Japanese transitive 
encoding lies between preliminary control and total lack of control. But the hierarchy 
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in (28) predicts that some languages are sensitive to the difference between outcome 
control and preliminary control. Lhasa Tibetan would be one such language. 
According to DeLancey (1985), both “lose” and “find” are non-volitional 
(non-intentional) in this language, and both are transitive in that two syntactic 
arguments are required. Building upon our classification presented in section 3.2, 
therefore, “lose” is a predicate of failure/mistake and “find” a predicate of success. 
Interestingly, these predicates differ in case marking of the initiator of the event: 
“lose” requires the ergative case for the loser while “find” assigns the dative case to 
the finder: 
(35) a.  k’o-s deb brlags soṅ 
he-ERG book lost PERF/EVIDENTIAL 
‘He lost the book (first-hand knowledge).’ 
 b.  k’o-la deb rñed soṅ 
he-DAT book find PERF/EVIDENTIAL 
‘He found the book (first-hand knowledge).’ (DeLancey 1985: 55) 
DeLancey ascribes this difference to the presence or absence of controllability 
(“outcome controllability,” in the present study): 
The significant difference between losing and finding is that finding must be a 
fortuitous event, while losing can be controlled. That is, one cannot guarantee 
finding a lost object; one can only look and hope. One can, however, guarantee not 
losing something; someone who exercises sufficient care will not lose things, so 
that the carelessness which results in loss constitutes a lapse of control. (DeLancey 
1985: 55; italic in the original) 
It is thus clear that this discrepancy in case-marking represents the difference between 
the two types of controllability. 
4.2 Mitsukaru in Japanese 
Formally, a Japanese verb mitsukaru (“get found”) is the intransitive counterpart 
of mitsukeru, a two-place predicate (F-predicate) that receives the canonical transitive 
encoding, as mentioned earlier. However, a closer inspection reveals that mitsukaru is 
associated with two types of interpretation in terms of transitivity. First, let us observe 
the following contrast: 
(36) a.  takara-ga (*tankenka-ni) mitsukatta 
treasure-NOM (explorer-DAT) get found 
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   Lit. ‘The treasure got found by an explorer.’ 
   (cf. tankenka ga takara o mitsuketa (‘An explorer found the 
treasure’)) 
 b.  Taroo-ga Jiro-ni mitsukatta 
   Taro-NOM Jiro-DAT got found 
   Lit. ‘Taroo (carelessly) got found by Jiro.’ 
These sentences are different in whether the finder can be overtly mentioned with –ni. 
This difference can be attributed to the outcome controllability on the part of the 
entity marked with –ga. In (36a), the treasure is not a sentient entity and can never 
exercise any control over the occurrence of the event designated. In (36b), on the 
other hand, Taro is human and can be construed to have a certain degree of control 
over the actualization of the denoted event. This is confirmed by the fact the sentence 
can undergo the formation of the negative imperative: 
(37) Jiro -ni mitsukaru -na  
 Jiro -DAT get found-PROH 
 Lit: ‘Don’t get found.’ 
Furthermore, (36b), unlike (36a), entails that Taro unintentionally caused an 
undesirable outcome; the realization of the event is attributed to Taro’s inadvertence. 
Thus, based on our classification proposed in section 3.2, mitsukaru in (36b) is a 
predicate of failure/mistake. In contrast, (36a) has no such connotation; it neutrally 
describes the realization of an event. In terms of transitivity, (36b) is slightly more 
transitive than (36a), which is close to a purely intransitive sentence. This contrast is 
made explicit by the ellipsis test: 
(38) a.  takara ga mitsukatta  [not elliptical] (cf. (36a)) 
 b.  Taroo ga mistukatta (with the entailment that Taro’s carelessness 
caused the event) [elliptical] (cf. (36b)) 
Without any preceding context, (38b) creates a sense that another core participant (i.e., 
the finder) is missing, whereas (38a) does not. Hence, cases with outcome 
controllability receive the encoding indicating higher transitivity than those without it. 
This fact supports the hierarchy (28). 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has discussed the notion of controllability. In section 2, two main points 
from the previous studies were discussed: (i) controllability is different from 
intentionality/volitionality in that the former is present even when the latter is absent, 
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and (ii) the availability of the negative imperative (or “prohibitive modality”) works 
as a test for the presence of controllability. Building upon these, Pardeshi claimed that 
the reason why non-intentional events can be expressed with the canonical transitive 
case-marking in Japanese is that controllability, not intentionality, is the key feature 
for the transitive encoding. 
In section 3, we pointed out the existence of a class of predicates (i.e. 
F-predicates) in Japanese that Pardeshi’s theory misses: transitive predicates of 
non-intentional events that cannot undergo the formation of the negative imperative. 
To capture this anomaly, I proposed to subdivide control into two classes: outcome 
control and preliminary control; outcome control corresponds to the control meant in 
the previous studies on controllability, and preliminary control is the intermediate 
category between the outcome control and total lack of control. Under this view, 
Japanese transitive encoding is analyzed to be sensitive to the gap between 
preliminary control and lack of control, rather than that between outcome and 
preliminary control. Finally, section 4 provided some other phenomena where the 
presence or absence of outcome control plays a key role, which supports the proposed 
distinction between outcome control and preliminary control. 
I hope that this brief discussion has contributed to the research on transitivity in 
general. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACC=accusative, CAUS=causative, DAT=dative, ERG=ergative, M=masculine, 
N=neuter, NOM=nominative, PAST=past tense, PROH=prohibitive, PERF=perfective, 
TOP=topic 
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